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Chapter 1: Ottoman state policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c.1780-c.1820: The Rise of the Greek-Owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet¹

By Gelina Harlaftis & Sophia Laiou

What indeed was an Ottoman ship? Few local mariners knew any rules of the sea, their papers were often incomprehensible, their crews resisted investigation with spirit. An honest Greek or Muslim was ordinarily armed to the teeth to defend himself; he might fly the red-white-blue of an Ottoman infidel, the green-white-red of a good Muslim, a Union Jack if he came from the Ionian Islands, or a blue and white striped flag if he was in Greek waters. The only true test was to see his cargo and his ship’s papers. So unless a pirate were actually caught at his trade, naval captains risked a diplomatic row every time they sent a boarding –party to search a suspect vessel².

Written by a British historian, this account of Ottoman ships implies that there were no rules or regulations, that the Ottoman vessels owned either by Christians or Muslims were under no jurisdiction and that they were synonymous with piracy and fraud. It is a view shared by many historians. Mainstream Greek historiography in particular has ignored the Ottoman political and economic framework within which the Ottoman Greek shipowners and captains were active. Behind this attitude, justified by the fact that until recently access to the Ottoman sources was difficult, there was the belief that the Ottoman state did not show any special interest in shipping and trade, since the latter did not coincide with the military, religious and bureaucratic structure of “Ottoman feudalism”³.

The Ottoman alienation from the sea is “an age-old trademark” based on “civilizational terms”, writes Edhem Eldem⁴. “The Ottomans were perceived and/or imagined as Turks and, as such, bore all the cultural traits of a nomadic people whose links with the sea were, by definition, tenuous, remote and, at best, accidental”. Greek national historiography follows this line, interpreting the reliance of the Ottoman imperial navy on Greek seamen as a reflection of the “negligence and inability” of the “Turks” in trade and shipping. “It was only natural for the Greeks to develop commerce due to their ancient commercial tradition, Byzantine heritage, the sea environment and the backwardness of the conqueror”⁵. Biological explanations are also used to support the view that “Turks have a natural aversion for the sea”⁶. The

fact that the Ottoman state had no merchant fleet of any significance and that not only its international but also its domestic trade during the 18th century was in the hands of the French is an argument frequently encountered in the French-language literature in particular.⁷

It is certainly true that during the period under examination Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean developed an important fleet based on the islands and port towns of the Aegean and Ionian seas. They did so as Ottoman or Venetian subjects, and under various flags, but mainly under the Ottoman. But thanks to the results of a major research project that has provided the archival evidence of this paper, many of the older assumptions described above look questionable.⁸ The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to demonstrate the importance of an Ottoman fleet involved in the Ottoman external and domestic trade with deep-sea going vessels that were fully armed and owned by Ottoman Greeks. Ottoman-flag vessels traded in all the main Italian port cities and Malta from the beginning of the 18th century, and showed an extraordinary growth after the 1780s. Moreover, the records provide evidence of the existence of a large coastal shipping fleet that ensured a large portion of the short-distance trade of the Empire. The second aim is to examine the policy of the Ottoman state towards the merchant marine and commerce. Evidence from the Istanbul archives reveals that systematic records were kept of all Ottoman flag-vessels, following a policy, initiated by Selim III (1789-1807), of protecting Ottoman-flag ships and their captains, with the specific aim of limiting foreign competition. It seems that the Levantine mariners and their Ottoman rulers understood very well “the rules of the sea”.

The Ottoman ships in Mediterranean shipping

In the 1780s the main local merchant shipping fleets of the Mediterranean were, on the western side the French, those of the Italian states, the Spanish and the Austrians, and on the eastern side the Ragusans and the Ottomans. Not all fleets were involved in the long-routes of the Mediterranean trade, that is the trade between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean and beyond Gibraltar. The French, according to the statistics of Ruggiero Romano for the European merchant fleets in 1786-1787, owned 5,268 ships of 729,340 tons; however, only a portion of these ships were involved in the Mediterranean trade, the others trading in the Atlantic and northern Europe⁹. The French ships trading between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean

belonged almost entirely to Marseille which had the monopoly of trade with the Levant¹⁰. According to the above mentioned statistics, the five Italian regional states (which despite the various changes of power in the 1780s, had remained as they were divided more or less since 15th century) owned altogether the second biggest fleet in the Mediterranean with 2,350 ships (253,815 tons). But it was only the fleets of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies (Naples) with 1047 vessels (132,222 tons) and that of the Republic of Venice with 418 vessels (60,332 tons) who owned ships of an average size of 130-140 tons that traded in the long routes of the Mediterranean. The rest, Genoa (and Piedmont), the Vatican State and Tuscany owned small vessels that carried the local trade of the Italian peninsula and of the regional trade within the Western Mediterranean, particularly with the French and Spanish coasts.

The third shipping fleet in the Mediterranean was that of Spain with 1202 ships (149,460 tons). Almost all big Spanish ships were involved in the colonial trade; the Mediterranean Spanish fleet consisted of small vessels engaged entirely in the Western Mediterranean trade very rarely trading beyond Sicily and Malta. The fourth power that rose in the Adriatic - centred in Trieste - was that of the Hapsburg Empire, which in late 1780s owned a fleet of 1142 ships (84,090 tons). This fleet was composed of small and medium-sized vessels with an average size of 74 tons, equipped with crews from the Dalmatian coastline, and it was involved mostly in the trade between the Adriatic and the ports of the Italian peninsula¹¹.

The two key local fleets of the Eastern Mediterranean were those of the Ragusans and of the Ottomans. The Ragusans, an affiliated state to the Ottoman Empire, were among the traditional local seafarers of the Balkans trading with big vessels in the Mediterranean. It seems that there is an upsurge of their shipping activities in the second half of the 18th century and although they carried cargoes from Salonica and Smyrna, they were heavily involved in the Alexandria-Livorno route¹². In 1786 they owned 163 vessels of 40,479 tons, which means vessels of an average of 250 tons¹³. Ruggiero Romano in his statistics does not include the Ottoman fleet as there were barely any available statistics of Ottoman-flag vessels involved in the long routes of the Mediterranean, trading within the Eastern Mediterranean and between the western and eastern Mediterranean. For the 1780s there is an estimate of about 400 vessels (48,000 tons); the fleet was composed of vessels of an average of 120 tons¹⁴. It seems then that in the 1780s, the Ottoman fleet was comparable or even bigger than those of the once omnipotent sea powers of Genoa and Venice.

The Ottoman fleet was involved in the long-routes of the Mediterranean and the Greeks were the traditional local seafarers of the Ottoman Empire who worked as merchant captains and seamen in Istanbul, the Black Sea and the Aegean ports, as shipwrights in the Ottoman shipyards, as crews in the Imperial Ottoman fleet, or as crews and captains in the fleets of the Barbary corsairs¹⁵. They owned small craft for the coastal trade between the islands and the main coasts of Greece and Asia Minor. In the late eighteenth century they emerged as the most dynamic neutral fleet in the Mediterranean and took advantage of European rivalry for the economic and political control of the Levant. They competed with the other important northern European fleets that traded in the Mediterranean, such as the British, the Dutch, the Swedish and the Danish¹⁶. By the end of the Napoleonic wars and under the Ottoman flag they had more than doubled their fleet. After the 1820s, Greeks under the flag of the Greek state, along with the British became the main carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea during the rest of the 19th century¹⁷.

Results

We traced Ottoman Greek vessels and other Greek-owned vessels under various flags in Venice, Trieste, Malta, Livorno, Genova, Marseilles, Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz. In all ports, apart from Venice, Sanità Archives have survived for most or all the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. These include detailed and valuable information, as they were registered by the quarantine officials, according to the declaration of their captains, concerning the name of the ship, the type of ship, name of captain, place of origin, nationality of vessel, number of seamen, port(s) where cargoes were loaded, kind of cargo and weight, length of journey, ports approached, merchants to which cargoes were destined (for sources see Appendix I).

The processed data as shown in Table 1, which is the annual average for every five year period of the arrival of Greek-owned ships under Ottoman and other flags, clearly indicates the impressive growth of Greek-owned vessels in Italian, Maltese, French and Spanish ports. Between 1773 and 1787 the number of Greek-owned vessels entering these ports rose fivefold, from 36 vessels to 166 vessels; the slight decline during the years 1788-1792 is due to the second Russo-Ottoman war. During the first five years of the Napoleonic wars the annual number of Greek-owned ships entering the above-mentioned ports almost tripled in comparison with the previous

five-year period : from 128 ships arriving annually during 1788-1792 to 312 ships during 1793-1797. Due to the French conquests and Napoleon's Egyptian expedition there were some problems in the sea-trade particularly during the period 1798-1802; the annual number of Greek-owned ships dropped to 290. In the next five year period that included the beginning of the continental blockade in 1806 the Greek-owned vessels trading in the Western Mediterranean ports reached their peak with the impressive annual average of 349 vessels.

Table 1: Annual average for every five-year period of number of Greek-owned ships arriving at the ports Venice, Trieste, Malta, Livorno, Genoa, Marseille, Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz

Year	Venice	Trieste	Malta	Livorno	Genoa	Marseille	Barcelona	Malaga	Cadiz	Total
1768-1772	8	11	9	10						38
1773-1777	11	6	5	14						36
1778-1782	13	26	25	18						82
1783-1787	11	40	73	30	12					166
1788-1792	13	14	55	39	7					128
1793-1797	10	25	39	71	134	33				312
1798-1802	7	3	63	71	110		15	12	9	290
1803-1807	17	1	147	91	13		22	35	23	349


Source: Appendix II

As is evident from Table 1, the importance of the Adriatic ports of Venice and Trieste shrank in comparison to those of the Italian western coast. Greek-owned ships, mainly under Ottoman flag, arrived in increasing numbers to Malta, Livorno and Genoa, reaching the unprecedented number of 250-300 on average annually during the Napoleonic wars (in contrast with the 20-30 ships that arrived in Venice and Trieste). Livorno and Genoa became the main centres of transit trade, with depôts for grain that fed not only the northern Italian peninsula, but also France, through Marseille, and the Iberian peninsula, through Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz.¹⁸ At the time of the Napoleonic wars the Ottoman flag was a neutral flag and Ottoman ships replaced those of France which disappeared from the Levant trade after the 1780s¹⁹. The Ottoman vessels competed successfully with those of Ragusa and of other

European powers to establish themselves as the main carriers of the Levant and the opening Black Sea grain market.

In the 1790s the Italian peninsula came under French control.²⁰ Grain was very much in demand and the sea-trade continued on neutral vessels, as, off the entrances of the main ports, the English navy and privateers of all nations were waiting for attacks. In 1796 the Greek-owned vessels mainly under Ottoman flag (at least in Livorno, see Figure 7) followed an upward trend and in 1796 reached their peak; more than 500 vessels entered all main ports of the Italian and French coast (Figure 1). It is mainly arrivals at the port of Genoa (347 ships) and Marseille (65) that shoot up. The victories of the French in the entire Italian peninsula, however, brought a wave of reaction. That same year commerce shrank but it soon recovered and stabilized for the next six years (Figure 1). In June 1800 Napoleon struck again to reconquer Italy; the victory won at Marengo over the armies of the Second Coalition marked the beginning of Italy's Napoleonic period. Between 1800 and 1808 all Italian territories of Italy fell directly under his control. In November 1806 Bonaparte imposed the Continental system to destroy British trade. But everywhere in Europe, merchants whose business was endangered by the blockade were able to penetrate the system, and the British turned Malta into their main transit trade point. Thus next peak of Greek-owned vessels in the west was in Malta in 1809 with 347 ships (Figure 1) most under the flag of Jerusalem (see Figure 8).

Figure 1: Greek-owned vessels under Ottoman and other flags in the ports of Venice, Trieste, Malta, Livorno, Genova, Marseille, Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz, 1780-1815



Source: as Appendix II

It is clear from the above analysis that the expanding Greek-owned fleet was a neutral fleet for most of the period under examination, using mainly the Ottoman flag, but also other flags if the political circumstances dictated. It thereby became highly important for the Levant trade, and particularly in grain for the main Western Mediterranean port cities. In the 1780s it carried almost 30% and in the 1790s almost 45% of the entire Levant trade of Livorno (Table 2). During the 1790s it carried one third of the grain from Levant and the Barbary States to Marseille (Table 3), while in 1796 Ottoman vessels were the only grain carriers to that city. But beyond grain and the Levant trade, the archival evidence indicates that Greek-owned vessels remained in the Western Mediterranean and carried the regional trade among Genoa, France, Spain and Portugal before returning to the Levant²¹. The presence of Greek-Ottoman ships in the Spanish ports of Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz is indicative of their importance long distance trade and cabotage of these ports (Figure 1 and Appendix II)²². In this way they became important not only in the grain trade from the Levant but in the total trade of these ports. The percentage of Greek-owned vessels in the total ship movements of Genoa and Livorno from 1792 to 1805 is indicated in Figure 2. During the years 1796-1798 they comprised up to 30% of the Genoese entire ship movements and 25% that of Livorno; also in 1801 the Greek vessels comprised up to

25% of the Genoese ship movements. In the years between they represented 5-10% of the total number of ships entering these two ports.

Table 2: Ottoman Greek ships entering at the port of Livorno from Levant (annual average for a five-year period)

Years	Ottoman Greek (a)	Total (b)	(a)/(b)
1768-72	6.6	65.8	10%
1773-77	10.6	82.8	13%
1778-82	9.2	78.8	12%
1783-87	24.6	94.4	26%
1788-92	30.2	103.2	29.3%
1793-97	61.8	142.2	43.5%

Source: Jean Pierre Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, 2ος τόμος, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998, table XVIII, p. 145


Table 3: Entries of ships to the port of Marseilles from the Levant and Barbary states

Year	(a) All ships	(b) Greek-owned ships	(b)/(a)
1789	341		
1790	286	2	1%
1791	393	3	1%
1792	366		
1793	80		
1794	34	4	12%
1795	124	28	22%
1796	69	65	94%
1797	85	21	25%
1798	64	18	28%

Sources: a) see Charles Carrière, *Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle*, volume 2, Marseilles, Institut historique de Provence, 1973, p. 1043.

b) Processed data from the data base *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2006


Figure 2: Percentage of Greek-owned vessels under Ottoman and other flags in the ports of Livorno and Genoa



Source: Appendix V


Naturally, Greek-owned vessels were not only significant in the main Western Mediterranean ports, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The French consuls provide us with important information on the Greek-owned vessels in Alexandria and Odessa. Up to almost 400 Greek-owned vessels arrived in Alexandria in the 1780s representing an average of 50% of the total arrivals at that port (Figure 4). This data stops abruptly with the French Revolution and re-starts in 1810 where almost 300 Greek-owned vessels are recorded in the following years (Figure 3) representing 70% of the total arrivals at that port. This is the period where the Russian grain started conquering the Mediterranean markets, the time when the Russian steppes began to be extensively cultivated, ultimately becoming the most important granary of Europe in the rest of the 19th century. Odessa, a new port city founded in 1794 by the Russians, as well as the port cities of the Azov, particularly Taganrog, witnessed an impressive and ever-increasing rate of grain exports²³. Greek-owned vessels under the Ottoman and Russian flags from 1800 to 1821 constituted an average of 60% of Odessa's total departures and some times became the exclusive carriers of the Odessa exports (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Greek-owned vessels under Ottoman and other flags at the ports of Alexandria and Odessa



Source: Appendix V

Figure 4: Percentage of Greek-owned vessels under Ottoman and other flags of the total arrivals of the ports of Alexandria and Odessa




Source: Appendix VI

The Ottoman archives provide mainly information regarding trade between Istanbul and the Black Sea. This information consists of permits for Russian Black Sea ports like Hacabey or Odessa and Taganrog in the Azov, along with the ports of south Black sea coast like Kerassund. As Figure 5 indicates there was an upward trend in the 1790s of ships trading in the Black Sea. The gap in the issuing of permits as documented in the Istanbul archives after 1787 is the result of the second Russo-

Ottoman war - a war really for the control of the Black Sea - which took place between 1787-1792. Although the Greek-owned vessels in the ports especially of Genoa and Livorno flourished in the 1790s (See Figure 1), the low numbers we have from Istanbul include only permits to sail in the Black Sea ports and the amount of cargoes of grain from the Black Sea was still low; grain still came from the Aegean coasts and southeastern Mediterranean. The rise in the number of permits to 40-60 ships during the period 1799-1802, however, indicates the increasing trade and the new dynamism of the Black Sea grain that from the turn of the century onwards conquered the Mediterranean and northern European markets. Figures from 1804 to 1821 include mainly the evidence from Register no.3, which will be explained in detail in the next section. This information indicates the large number of vessels involved in the Mediterranean and the opportunities they were able to seize during the Continental Blockade.

Figure 5: Number of Ottoman Greek ships getting permissions/documents from Istanbul for navigation in the Black Sea and Mediterranean trade, 1780-1821



Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

Table 4: Arrivals of Greek-owned ships to Genoa, 1784-1811

Arrivals from	Number of ships	%
<i>Eastern Mediterranean</i>	612	60%
Aegean Sea	428	70%
South-eastern Mediterranean	158	26%
Ionian Sea	17	3%
Black Sea	9	1%
<i>Western Mediterranean</i>	400	40%
Total	1012	


Sources: Avvisi, 1784-1797; Archivio di Stato di Genova, Pandetta 12, Ufficio di Sanita, Arrivi di Capitani e Padroni, 1682-1694, (1801-1811)

In order to give a picture as to the origin of grain bound for western Mediterranean ports, we have chosen to analyze the origin of the grain cargoes to Genoa as indicated in Table 4. It seems that of the 612 ships that arrived at the port of Genoa from the 1780s to 1790s from Levant, a large part remained in the Western Mediterranean to trade regionally before returning to the Eastern Mediterranean. From the ships that arrived from the Levant, 70% came from destinations from the Aegean Sea, 26% from the south-eastern Mediterranean, 1% came directly from the Black Sea to Genoa and only 3% from the Ionian islands. Although Black Sea ports significantly increased after the turn of the century, we assume that the importance of the Black Sea grain is under represented and that it was transported in the Aegean islands to be re-exported to the western Mediterranean.

More than one-third of the grain came from northwestern Aegean, mainly from the Gulf of Volos, the main export area of grain from the plains of Thessaly as is evident from the arrivals to Malta and Genoa. The other two thirds of the cargoes of grain came from northeastern and southwestern Aegean, mainly from the islands of Psara and Lesbos, of Hydra and Spetses. Apart from Lesbos, the other three islands, Psara, Hydra and Spetses are barren islands, merely rocks in the sea, definitely without any production of grain. What happened was that all four islands had become transit points, where grain was deposited until it was trans-shipped on board vessels to take it to the west. This trans-shipment from ship to ship is recorded many times in the archival material. Psara and Lesbos most likely received grain from the Black Sea or Thessaly, whereas Hydra and Spetses deposited grain from the Peloponnese and the Black Sea. Deposit on ships or in deserted areas of islands that were notorious for lack of rain and moisture meant lesser damage to the cargo. In this way, the need for grain in the West formed this chain of transit nodes on the islands of the Aegean.

Needless to say, the transit points became also the maritime centers of the Aegean as they developed in the last third of the 18th century: Hydra, Spetses and Psara. Under the impact of the dramatic increase of the demand of grain during the Napoleonic wars these latter three islands built large merchant ships as grain carriers, and the Aegean islanders developed a special trade and shipping system. The evidence from the Ottoman archives reveals that the ships from islands of northern and central Aegean like Skopelos, Mykonos, Santorini, Tinos and Kasos (31% of the total permissions received as shown in Figure 6) were small to medium size ships with an average crew of 12 men on board. These carried grain from the Black Sea, Thessaly or Asia Minor to the island-deposits of the Aegean from where the captains of big deep-sea going vessels of Hydra, Psara and Spetses (a total of 51% of the permissions received) carried it to the western Mediterranean ports. The sailing shipowners of Messolongi and Galaxidi who received a total of 18% of the permissions granted carried the grain and other cargoes from the Corinthian bay and the coast of western Greece in the Ionian Sea to Malta and Livorno.

Figure 6: Place of origin of Ottoman Greek ships, 1780-1820



Source: A.DVNS. IZN 1-5, *Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry, Istanbul*

Map 1: The main maritime centers of the Ottoman Greek fleet, 1780-1820

It was from the Ionian Sea that the beginning of the rise of the Ottoman fleet first started. The increase of the maritime trade was linked with the impressive

Σχόλιο [MU1]: Map one here please

increase of the land trade that was connected with the development of the entrepreneurial networks of Ottoman Greeks in the Balkans and Western European cities since the early 18th century, and particularly after the Treaty of Belgrade (1739), when with the achievement of peace in the area, a great stimulus to trade in southeastern Europe took place. Apart from becoming the main land carriers of the Balkans, the Ottoman Greeks in the last third of the 18th century developed a combined land and sea transport between western Balkans and the Italian cities of Trieste, Ancona, Messina, Malta, Livorno and Genoa²⁴. In relation to this latter trade, an important Greek-owned fleet developed belonging to Ottoman and Venetian Greeks. The main maritime centres of the Ionian Sea were Cephalonia and Ithaca, on the Venetian side, and Messolongi, Aetoliko and Galaxidi, on the Ottoman side (see Map 1). This fleet served the hinterland of Epirus, Aitoloakarnania and western Peloponnese, and sailed mostly under the Ottoman flag, even if the vessels were owned by Cephalonians or Ithacans.

It was parallel to this development on the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire, in the second half of the 18th century that the Greek-owned fleet grew in the Aegean Sea as we have indicated above. By the 1820s, an international entrepreneurial network of a commercial and maritime diaspora of Ottoman Greeks had been formed and expanded on two axes: the first one was the formation of networks within the Ottoman Empire, and the second one was the formation of land and maritime trade networks of Greek entrepreneurial networks from the Black Sea to northern Europe²⁵.

Ottoman policy towards maritime commerce: protection and the flag.

A major issue for all who sailed on the Mediterranean seas was the safe transfer of commodities, that is protection from the attacks of the Barbary corsairs, pirates, and European privateers. Risk at sea and continuous hazards from attacks meant that there could be no safe conduct in the Mediterranean without an armed merchant vessel of a certain substantial size. This was certainly acknowledged by the Ottoman officials, and the Ottoman Greek vessels were all well armed as the Ottoman archival evidence indicates. For example, all 239 ships of 1805 and 367 ships of 1809 of the islands or port towns of Hydra, Psara, Spetses, Trikeri, Mykonos, Sifnos, Kasos, Patmos, Tinos, Limnos, Poros and Messolongi (as per DVNS.İZN.d. 3) were armed. On the 1st of February 1805, for instance, the ship of Gika Gianni from Hydra carried

35 men and 8 canons, 35 rifles, 25 carbines, 35 knives and 35 pistols²⁶. The largest ship of that year must have been the ship of Yorgi Dimitri, also from Hydra, that carried 60 men with 16 canons, 60 rifles, 40 carbines, 60 knives, and 60 pistols²⁷. These were large ships between 100 and 200 tons, and it is with this kind of ships that they traded in the West. Although between 1805 and 1821 the average crew was 30 men, large crews of 50 and 60 men were not unusual, all armed and ready to fight.

The arming of the ships was only one of the measures taken by the Ottoman state to protect the maritime commerce in the Ottoman seas²⁸. The second step was the effort to restrict the foreign protection system, which allowed the *berath* Ottoman subjects not only to enjoy the privileges offered to the foreign merchants as stipulated in the capitulations, but also to avoid the payment of the capitation tax (*cizye*) and to pay reduced rates on other taxes²⁹. This new attitude towards commercial policy was initiated in August 1802, during the reign of Selim III, when it was declared that select non-Muslim *reaya* who were engaged with international trade would be renamed “merchants of Europe” (*Avrupa tüccarları*), who would get their *berats* from the Sublime Porte and would have the same privileges as the other “*protegées*”, without entering, however, under a foreign protection³⁰. In the same period the Ottoman state for the first time opened Ottoman embassies and consulates in the European countries, which would also promote the economic interests of the Ottoman subjects active abroad. Between 1802-1807 in Messina, Palermo Napoli, Livorno, Genoa, Venice, Trieste, Marseille, and Lisbon Ottoman consulates were established³¹. Thus, from the Messina Archives we are informed that Antonino Genzardi was in 1792 the Ottoman Consul in Palermo³². The Archives of Corfu give us the information that Nicolaos Varvessis was the Ottoman Consul in Messina in the beginning of the 19th century³³. Also from the Archives of the Community of Hydra we learn that Enrico Popie Geltemestri [sic] was the Ottoman consul in Lisbon during the same period³⁴ and from the Genoa Archives we are informed that the Chiot Nicolas Petrocochino in 1813 was the Ottoman Consul in Genoa³⁵.

One aspect of the above-mentioned policy is clearly revealed in the Ottoman register DVNS. İZN.D. 3, located in the Prime Ministerial Archive of Istanbul. The register contains 179 pages and covers the period 1804-1821³⁶. The register has the general title “*Reaya İzn-i Sefine Defteri*”, written on the cover, but in page 6 a whole section begins up to page 163, with the title “*Reaya-i devlet-i aliyyeden Bahr-i Sefid’de ticaret edenlerin yedlerine verilecek evamirin defteridir*” (Register of the orders which

will be given to the subjects of the exalted state, who practice commerce in the Aegean Sea). There are 1423 entries from 1804-1821 referring to Christian reaya³⁷; each of them includes the name of the captain and his origin, the type and sometimes the name of the ship, the number of the seamen, the armament and sometimes a resumé of three decrees, which are given to the captain³⁸. The first decree is addressed to the captains of the three *ocaks* of North Africa (Algeria, Tripoli and Tunisia), who were asked not to harass the captain and his ship during the voyage in the Aegean. The second one was addressed to the Ottoman judges and customs officials in the Aegean islands as well as in the coastal areas of Anatolia and Rumili, demanding from them not to harass the captain, if the latter had paid the custom dues “according to custom” and the “other taxes”. The third decree was addressed again to the Ottoman judges and the collectors of the capitation tax in the Aegean islands and the above-mentioned coastal areas, asking them not to demand the capitation tax from the captain. These decrees were issued according to a report submitted by the chief admiral (*kapudan paşa*) or the head of the imperial navy yard (*tersane emini*) or even by the supervisor of the naval affairs (*umur-i bahriye nâzırı*, bearing also the title of the third *defterdar*). Occasionally the orders are given *in extenso*, particularly in the first pages of the register³⁹.

The register is divided into sections in accordance with the office of the *Grand Vezir* and the *Reisülküttab* (Minister of Foreign Affairs, responsible for the issuing of the *berats*) and it is characterized by a variability in the length of the entries. Thus, besides the type of the entry described above, there are shorter entries, where it is stated that three decrees were granted to the captain regarding safe conditions for trade and the exemption from the capitation tax (*temin ve ticaret ve muafiyeti*), issued in accordance with a report of one of the above-mentioned officials.

In the first pages of the register there is a request submitted to Selim III in September 1804, most probably by the then chief admiral of the Ottoman fleet or by the dragoman of the imperial fleet, referring to the increase of the use of the Russian flag or flags of other states by the Ottoman subjects of the islands of the Aegean Sea, who were under foreign protection. It was also stated that, although according to the 17th article of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) those of the reaya who wished to abandon the country (and settle in Russia) had a time-limit of one year to remove their movable property; their profession should be asked, since they declared that they belonged to the protégés (of Russia). Because of the financial loss of the state caused

by the extensive use of the protection system and the use of foreign flags, it was proposed to offer certain privileges (*imtiyazlar*) to the reaya ship-owners and captains in order to “attract and gather” them (*celb ve telifleriyle*). Indeed, those who abandoned the foreign protection and “returned to the Ottoman state”, would pay the “usual” custom dues and should not be pressured to pay more⁴⁰. They would travel in safety and no Ottoman official could disturb them. They would be exempt from the payment of the customary dues (*tekalif*), while those of the captains who also owned the ship they would be exempt from the capitation tax. Finally, it was proposed that they be free to dress themselves as they wished. The official requested the issuance of the necessary sultanic orders for the implementation of these privileges⁴¹.

The request was accepted and the new “system” regarding the merchant marine was applied. In this context, a letter written again in September 1804 by the then dragoman of the imperial fleet Panayotis Mourouzis⁴² and addressed to the inhabitants of the island of Hydra presented the “new system”. The inhabitants of the island would have to send a list with the names of the *reaya* captains in order to receive a certain number of *berats* and firmans. The local notables would distribute the official documents, under the provision that those who were interested would provide letters of guarantee⁴³.

The above demonstrate the new policy of Selim III, aiming at the support of Ottoman maritime commerce against the “foreigner”, that is ships owned by Ottoman subjects but flying a foreign flag. This new policy can certainly be combined with the above-mentioned policy of the “merchants of Europe” (*Avrupa tüccarları*); the latter, however, was initially not very successful and the year 1806 was crucial for these “protégés”. In May, an Hydriot sent a letter from Istanbul to the notables of his island, referring to the forced sale of the shops of the “protégés” and the fact that the state treasury would get 10% of the price. The rich *beratlı* would have to move to the state by which they were protected, without however having the right to take their families with them. This new policy concerned the *beratlı* of all the foreign states⁴⁴. Five months before a memorandum had been sent to the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia, which restricted the privileges of the *beratlı* (prohibition of movement and prohibition of trade occupation), while in May it was established that the “merchants of Europe” would receive their *berats* from the Sublime Porte by paying 1.500 *ğuruş*. The protégés of Russia were threatened with the seizure of their ships⁴⁵. In July 1806, a mandate issued by the treasurer of the imperial naval yard was

addressed to the local notables of the island of Hydra, instructing them to send a list of the captains who used the Russian flag on their ships, declaring also the reasons they did so. It was also stated that because a large number of the ships of the Ottoman subjects used the Russian flag, it seemed necessary to “change the flags”⁴⁶. In the same month a list of the “*reaya* ships” as well as of the consuls and vice-consuls in Hydra was requested, since the appointment of *reaya* in these positions was against the agreements (*ahdname*) between the Ottoman Empire and the foreign governments⁴⁷. At the same time, those of the captains who wished to abandon the foreign flags and use the Ottoman one, would not face any negative consequences⁴⁸.

A number of warranty letters presented by the captains are mentioned in the register⁴⁹. The need for presenting a warranty letter is referred in the above-mentioned letter of Mourouzis. Those of the captains who acquired the official documents by themselves in Istanbul, had to present a warranty letter issued by the local notables of their place of origin. There are cases where the guarantors of the captains were the local notables (*kocabaşlılar*) of the islands of Hydra and Spetses, and the port town of Galaxidi, who guaranteed the exclusive use of the Ottoman flag. If, however, the Ottoman flag was not raised or the captain possessed patents from other states or even if his actions turned against the “official system”, the guarantors would have to remit 5.000 ğuruş in the treasury of the imperial naval yard⁵⁰. If the captain did not present such a warranty letter and the lapse was established, the ship and the merchandise would be seized by the state and the captain would be punished⁵¹.

In the Ottoman register under study only the 6,5% of the entries mention the existence of warrantors (93 entries). The vast majority of the 6,5% are entries from 1806, a very crucial year as it was stated above. The others are from the years 1807-1808 and 1812-1816. It seems that the policy of providing warranty letters was gradually abandoned or the mechanisms of control became lax over time. However, what is important is the study of the persons who acted as warrantors. Besides the local notables of the island from which the captain and/or ship-owner came, the majority of them were Greek inhabitants of Istanbul or merchants staying in one of the *han* of the capital. In most cases the warrantors were of the same local origin as the captains or they came from a near place of origin, while some of them must have been relatives. When the occupation of the warrantor is mentioned, they were merchants (*tacir*, *bazirgân*), shop-owners in Istanbul and in two cases the warrantors are characterized as “merchants of Europe”⁵². Also, the vekil of the island of Syros in

the capital is mentioned⁵³ along with Greek artisans working in the imperial naval yard⁵⁴, owners of coffe-shops⁵⁵ and certain local notables from the place of origin of the captain or from nearby⁵⁶. In 9 cases the warrantors were Ottoman Muslim officials, merchants or other professionals. For example, Kostas son of Panayotis from Messolongi presented as warrantor a certain Hüseyin ağa, official in the sancak (district) of Yanya (Yannena), and Andronis from Sfakia (Crete) presented three Muslim merchants⁵⁷. Also, Kostantis son of Yorgi from Çeşme presented as warrantor Hacı Halil, a *kapan* merchant⁵⁸.

It seems that the warrantors and the captains/ship-owners were partners in a common enterprise. Although we do not know the exact legal framework of their partnership or if there were other partners in it, it seems that the investment of capital in enterprises was a common practice not only for people who possessed and circulated capital (merchants, notables, officials) but also for other professionals such as artisans. Also, it must be stressed that the common interest led to intra communal and intra-confessional co-operation, revealing how Ottoman officials wished to avail themselves of external trade⁵⁹.

The dragoman of the imperial fleet was involved in the procedure of submitting the warranty letters to the imperial naval yard, or even in the issuing of such letters, in the case of captains who did not possess such documents from the local notables. It is also probable that for each letter of guarantee which came to the attention of the dragoman of the fleet, the latter would receive a certain sum of money, as was the case with the issuing of the permissions for voyages to the Black Sea⁶⁰. At the same time, of course, Selim III was trying to reorganize the Ottoman navy by employing educated personnel and constructing modern ships with the help of foreign experts and Greek shipbuilders. In 1806, a Ministry of the Navy was established for the first time and also there was a reorganization of the navy's administration⁶¹. The Sultan's efforts to ottomanize the merchant marine can thus be set within the broader scope of the reforms which he tried to impose⁶². In this context, the answer of Selim III to the above-mentioned request of his high official, as revealed in a copy of his "imperial script" (*hatt-i hümayun*), is illuminating for his way of thinking. Not only does he give his consent to the proposed measures, but he urges that official to try his utmost to increase the merchants and the number of the ships, since no one has ever tried this before. Indeed, he stresses that the only business of the foreign states is commerce. He adds that there are no Ottoman commercial

ships left and he does not know what to do about this.⁶³ The sultan seemed to be very much concerned about the severe impoverishment of the Ottoman merchant marine, comparing it with the foreign ones active in the eastern Mediterranean. His goal was economic: improving the international competition of its subjects in the Mediterranean trade and shipping would help the Ottoman economy.

On the other hand, his policy also had a socio-political aspect. His aim was to strengthen the state against social groups which could threaten it, such as the janissaries and the ulema. The *reaya*-protégés formed another such group, since they could not be fully controlled by the state. Hence reverting to the idea that social mobility should be restricted or under the strict control of the state in order to maintain social integrity did not have only financial motives (such as loss of revenues from the capitation tax, or frustration at the state's inability to confiscate the property of a protégé), but political ones too: it aimed at extending the state's control over all strata of Ottoman society⁶⁴. Besides, a special characteristic of the state's attitude towards the economy was the maintenance of the political-economic "traditional order" and the division of labor which this entailed. That is to say, the Ottoman state felt uncomfortable towards methods of capital accumulation which did not belong to this "order" and especially, by people who did not belong to the political-military elite⁶⁵. As Quataert has shown, Selim III also tried to restore the clothing laws, which were first imposed in the 16th century, in order to distinguish the Muslims and the non-Muslims, the *reaya* and the Ottoman officials. It is indicative that the sultan not only invoked the need for keeping the moral order, but also to strengthen the local cloth industry⁶⁶. In this respect it is certainly not by chance that in 1806 the clothing laws for the non-Muslim *reaya* became stricter⁶⁷.

These measures for the control of external trade and the limitation of the protection system were taken in a period of turbulent international relations, characterised by the expansionist foreign policy of Napoleon Bonaparte and the efforts of Great Britain and Russia to stop it. Both sides needed the alliance of the Ottoman Empire, while, at the same time, they were trying to control it in political terms and also to establish their economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The above-mentioned measures coincided with the victory of France in the battle of Austerlitz in December 1805 and the reorientation of the Ottoman foreign policy toward an alliance with France followed by the declaration of war against Russia in December 1806. The imposition of the new policy against the protégés has thus

naturally been explained as the result of France's strong influence in the Sublime Porte and an effort to limit Russian influence over the non-Muslim Ottoman *reaya*. It is thought that the Phanariote, Dimitrios Mourouzis, a well known "friend" of Russia, played an important role, because he tried to appease the sultan for his pro-Russian political positions by suggesting the limitation of the protection system⁶⁸. On the other hand, there is the explanation that Mourouzis tried to protect Greek protégés from the arbitrary reactions of the Ottoman government, whenever relations between the Ottoman state and the foreign state that granted the protection worsened. He also wanted to favour the Greek protégés, because the issuing of the berat by the Sublime Porte in order to become a "merchant of Europe" cost much less than getting a berat by a foreign ambassador or consul and thereby become a *beratlı*/protégé⁶⁹.

Without intending to underestimate the international conditions, however, we believe that Selim III's commercial policy was driven by more than merely the deterioration of the Russian-Ottoman relations. It also had a much broader scope, aiming at the improvement of the Ottoman economy as a whole.

Table 5: Number of Ottoman Greek vessels registered in Istanbul between 1804-1821 as revealed in DVNS.İZN 3

Years	Number of vessels
1804	42
1805	239
1806	190
1807	2
1808	6
1809	367
1810	106
1811	55
1812	153
1813	51
1814	14
1815	36
1816	40
1817	18
1818	36
1819	23
1820	34
1821	11
Total	1.423

Source: *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, DVNS. İZN. 3*

To be sure, the attempt to limit the protection system and also to restore the clothing laws predated Selim III.⁷⁰ But how successful was he, in comparison with his

predecessors? In the register DVNS.IZN.3, for the period 1804-1808 there are 479 entries for non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, who requested and received sultanic decrees, which ensured for them freedom for trade, protection from piratical attacks, exemption from the capitation tax and the payment of the custom dues only “according to the custom” (*ber mutad*) and not more. There are only two entries for 1807 and 6 for 1808 as is evident from Table 5. This disparity can be explained by the war against Russia, during which the inhabitants of Hydra, and possibly other islanders too, were asked to demobilize their ships by burning the steering and other basic ship’s equipment, in order to prevent their use by the Russians⁷¹, and also by the dethronement of Selim III and the political turbulence that followed. For the period 1809-1820 there are 960 entries, with uneven distribution. However, in the year 1809, 367 non-Muslim Ottoman subjects had applied for the grant of the above-mentioned decrees, much more than any other year.

The register does not mention any special status of the applicants, that is if they were “merchants of Europe”. The only criterion that can help is the payment or not of the capitation tax. According to Masters, who had consulted registers from 1815 and 1839-1861, the “merchants of Europe” in Aleppo paid the capitation tax but much less than normally, while the payment of the specific tax meant to “remind” them their *reaya* status⁷². However, in the above-mentioned letter of 1804 written by the then dragoman of the imperial fleet, the captains who would follow the “new system” would not pay the capitation tax⁷³. Also, Urquhart mentions that the “merchants of Europe” would be exempted⁷⁴. It is probable, however, that in the course of the time the exemption from the capitation tax was abolished.

Nevertheless, the answer to the question whether the applicants belonged to the “merchants of Europe” or, as Ottoman subjects they shared special privileges, does not alter the reality; to wit, taking under consideration the above-mentioned evidence, we have the picture of a social-professional group, which followed the regulations of the “new system” in relation to the merchant marine, shared the same privileges with the protégés of the foreign states and at the same time remained *reaya*. The fact that the register is divided into sections according to who was the current *Reisülkittab* strengthens the argument that the applicants shared a special status.

The effectiveness of the Ottoman effort to control external trade and to “regain” the *reaya* can be ascertained only if we have a clear picture of the *beratlı*. In fact, both Ottoman and Western sources show the extensive use of the Ottoman flag

even before the implementation of this new policy. Table 6 indicates the proportion of the Ottoman flag used during the period 1780 to 1810 as recorded in almost 5,000 Greek-owned ships. More than 80% of the Greek-owned ships that traded to Malta, Livorno and Genoa, that is on the long-routes of the Mediterranean carried the Ottoman flag. As far as the Russian flag is concerned, for which there is an extensive Greek bibliography stressing the impetus posed by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774⁷⁵, in the period 1767-1815 the evidence below is indicative: The use of the Russian flag by the Greek-owned vessels trading in Western Europe was indeed very limited as the archival evidence on which Table 6 is based indicates. In Genoa is almost nil, in Malta 6% of the Greek-owned vessels carried the Russian flag, and in Livorno, 9%. For the whole period and for the three ports only 6% of the vessels that traded west carried the Russian flag. The use of the Russian flag was minimal before 1800s and there were just a few vessels that carried the flag during the two Russo-Ottoman wars of 1769-1774 and 1787-1791. There was an increase of the use of the Russian flag between 1800-1808 but never exceeding the 30 ships, or the 20% of the Greek-owned vessels trading with Livorno or Malta. Moreover, according to Kremmydas' calculations between 1810-1821 half of the ships which passed from the port of Patras had the Ottoman flag and belonged to *reaya* of Greek origin⁷⁶. Also, according to Pouqueville, in 1816 63,6% of the Greek merchantmen used the Ottoman flag and 36,3% the Russian⁷⁷.

Table 6: Greek-owned ships under various flags, 1780-1810

Port	Ottoman flag	Venetian flag	Russian flag	Ionian	Other*	Total number Of ships
Malta	64%	3%	6%	4%	23%*	2352
Livorno	83%	6%	9%	2%	0%	1604
Genoa	98%	1%	0.2%	0	0,8%**	1024
	83%	3%	6%	2%	8%	4980

* Jerusalem, Prussian, Austrian, British, French


Source: Processed data from the data base *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2006

During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1806-1812 the use of the Russian flag disappears and only for the Greek-owned ships trading in Malta do we have the use of the flag of Jerusalem for only two years, 1808 and 1809 as is evident from Figure 8. The Jerusalem flag used as one of convenience by a number of states of the time was the

flag of the Order of St. John of Malta⁷⁸. Its use by the Greeks was temporary, as very few Greek-owned ships traded under the Jerusalem flag after 1810.


Also the Venetian flag was very little used probably even by Venetian Greeks of the so-called “Venetian Levant”, and it disappeared with the extinction of the Republic in 1797. The use of the Ionian flag appears with the short-lived establishment of Septinsular Republic on the Ionian islands. The “other” flags comprise of the short-term use of various flags, Prussian, Austrian, British or French.

Figure 7: Greek-owned vessels arriving at the port of Livorno under Ottoman and other flags, 1767-1815



Source: Appendix III

Figure 8: Greek-owned vessels arriving at Malta under Ottoman and other flags, 1780-1810



Source: Appendix IV

From the above it is evident that the international conjuncture together with the Ottoman protection of Greek ship-owners and merchants gave an important boost to the Ottoman merchant fleet that now developed as the main carrier of the Levant trade. However, how can this rise be combined with Selim's dramatic statement that there were no Ottoman merchantmen in 1804? It seems that the slight increase in the use of the Russian flag in the first years of the 19th century alerted the Ottoman officials. Moreover, this increase must have been higher as far as the regional trade in the Aegean and Black Sea is concerned, more so when the trade with the Black Sea was very important for the provision of Istanbul⁷⁹. Thus, the insistence on the question of the flag and the limitation of the *berathl* were due to the need to control political and economic developments within the Ottoman society, and did not intend to turn against commercial activity. In the beginning of the 19th century the Ottoman state developed a specific commercial and maritime policy, which aimed at the limitation of the protection system in order to have its merchants compete with the foreign states on an equal basis. This policy was expressed by the privileges accorded to those who used the Ottoman flag, the allowance to construct well-armed large vessels, and the establishment of Ottoman consuls in western European Mediterranean ports.

In the final analysis, the policy of Selim III was prophetic and the formation of a powerful Ottoman Greek fleet ultimately backfired: at least some of the *beratlis* and the protégés of the Ottoman state with their armed vessels contributed to the formation of a Greek revolutionary navy that joined the Greek War of Independence in 1821.

Appendix I : Sources

In Malta the Sanità archives were found for the whole of the 18th century up to 1816 in the National Library of Malta in Valletta under the title “Archives of the Order of St. John, Commissarii di Sanità, 639, Registri arrivi di quarantena”, 818 volumes 1-14”. For the port of Livorno most researchers –apart from Jean Pierre Filippini- have looked for the Ufficiali di Sanità in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, as the Livorno officials would send such documentation to the central government. The documents of the Ufficiali di Sanità archives after 1778 in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, were destroyed in the Florence 1877 flood, and it is more than once stated that the documentation of the Livorno Sanità archives does not exist after 1778⁸⁰. In the Archivio di Stato di Livorno, however, all the Sanità books for the port are found intact in the series 33, “Magistrato poi Dipartimento di Sanità marittima (1606-1860)”, volumes 621-626 and 696-706 where complete evidence of the daily arrival of ships from Levant and the Barbary States are registered in the port with all their details from 1767 to 1860⁸¹. In Genoa, evidence of arrivals of ships from suspected areas are found in the Archivio di Stato di Genova, “Ufficio di Sanità. Arrivi di Capitani e Padroni and in the Registro di Spedizioni dei Capitani e Patenti” for the years, 1780-1819. Furthermore, daily arrivals at the port of Genoa from all destinations are published in the valuable weekly maritime and commercial Journal of Genoa named *Avvisi* that run from 1778 to 1797; we found this journal in microfilms in the *Biblioteca Universitaria* of the University of Genoa⁸². All the Italian archives of Sanità include arrivals of foreign vessels, excluding their own national coastal craft. In Marseille the evidence derives from the Archives Départementales des Bouches du Rhône, Serie 200 E 474-604, «Dépositions et Arrivages. Déclarations faites par les capitaines de bâtiments à leur arrivée». The problem with the above mentioned French archives is that these enormous volumes include all arrivals including small coastal craft of even five tons. Data for Trieste was found in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia, in the series “Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia”. In Venice no Sanità has survived and we were able to draw valuable data of Greek-owned ships under Venetian flag from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia from the series “Scuole piccole e suffragi, san Nicolo dei marinieri”, which is the guild of the Venetian seamen. This series is complete for the whole of the eighteenth century and contains details of all the crews of Venetian flag vessels.

As far as the Ottoman sources are concerned, we have drawn evidence from five register books catalogued as “*İzn-i Sefine Defterleri*” (DVNS.İZN.d. 1-5), located in the Prime Ministry Archive of Istanbul (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, BOA), that include permissions for the ships sailing to and from the Black Sea during 1780-1821⁸³. Register no. 3 includes registration of all vessels that sailed in the Mediterranean from 1804-1821, following the new “system” (nizam) which was applied by the Ottoman State during the reign of Selim III. Moreover, information on Greek-owned vessels was drawn from *Cevdet-i Maliye* 3893, 4311 and 4870 (BOA) and from court registers located in the State Archives of Macedonia, in Thessaloniki. Archival research in this valuable material gave us a harvest of 2,104 registrations of Ottoman Greek vessels. Needless to say, that these registrations do not reveal the actual number of vessels but the number of voyages for which permissions or documents were granted.

We have not visited the Spanish archives but we have drawn evidence from the processed data, drawn partly from the Suprema Junta de Sanidad del Reino and published in the periodical *Diario de Barcelona, 1792-1801*, in Eloy Martín Corrales, “La flotta greco-otomana en Cadiz a fines del siglo XVIII” in *Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Andalucía, Andalucía Moderna (II)*, Córdoba 1995, pp. 389-400 and in Eloy Martín Corrales, “Cereales y capitanes greco-otomanos en la Málaga de fines del siglo XVIII”, *Estudis d’Història Econòmica*, vol. 1989/2, pp. 87-114.

Greek-owned vessels were selected according to the names of the captain and the ship; as evidence from the local archives has shown, our working hypothesis is that most captains were also owners of their vessels or co-owners with other local entrepreneurs⁸⁴. So, for example, when we find in the archives Yiorgi Burbachi from Messolongi with the pollaca *Madonna di Broso*, or Andrea di Dimitri, with the pollaca *Madonna di Hydra* or Andrea Lucheri from Galaxidi with the *Madonna di Megaspileo*, we register the ships as Greek-owned. And we have to note that we met no Muslim names of Ottoman vessels trading in the Italian and French ports. Moreover, the employees of the Sanità of Malta wrote down the captains of the Ottoman flag vessels owned by Greeks as “Greci” and the Genoese officials distinguished them according to their island of origin, “ottomano idriotto” or “ottomano ipsariotto”, while the French consuls referred to the Ottoman vessels as “grecs” or “turcs”. A question that arises is why would vessels and captains be described as “Greek” in the western Mediterranean European ports. A preliminary

remark could be that we have an ethnic-religious self-determination on behalf of Ottoman Greeks, but further research is necessary especially for the periods in which this term appears. Also, it seems that this ethno-religious connotation was accepted or applied by the port authorities of Malta or the French consuls. Finally, could this specific characterization, apart from being an ethno-religious determination, also denote a sort of “brand name” in the Mediterranean entrepreneurship that reflected “trustworthy service”? Namely, an Ottoman Greek captain from Messolongi or Hydra, or Psara who traded regularly to the west was considered reliable? Whatever the case, we presuppose that the “Greek” or “Greek-flag” ship can be considered as an “Ottoman” one. It should also be underlined that our statistics rely on arrivals of ships, and count under what flag they were registered upon arrival. It is very probable that the captains changed the flag of their ship during the voyage⁸⁵.

On the other hand, there were certainly vessels owned by Ottoman Muslims, or co-owned with the Greeks⁸⁶. But it seems that these were mostly engaged in the regional trade of the Eastern Mediterranean and that the Ottoman Muslims preferred to act mainly as investors in maritime commerce, including the ownership of portions of ships, and not necessarily as ship-owners/captains and/or merchants.

The combined data from the above archives was fed in the database *Amphitrete* from where we were able to form the statistics as shown in Appendices that form the basis of the quantitative analysis that follows. We have followed the usual method adopted by maritime historians dealing with shipping statistics. The number of ships arriving to a certain port at a particular year really means total number of voyages that a certain number of vessels make. If, for example, 54 ships arrived at the port of Livorno in the year 1794, this does not mean that 54 different ships arrived at the port of Livorno that year. There might be one ship that arrived four times at Livorno (or made four voyages that year to Livorno) and there might be another 25 ships that made only one trip that year to Livorno. What is important here for the general picture and for the analysis of shipping statistics is the total number of arrivals to a port and not the number of individual ships trading in the port.

Appendix II

Arrivals of Greek-owned ships in the ports of Western Mediterranean

Year	Venice	Trieste	Malta	Genova	Livorno	Marseille	Barcelona	Malaga	Cadiz
1780	5	23	24		21				
1781	9	12	35		17				
1782	21	38	33		22				
1783	20	21	35	20	22				
1784	14	66	43	2	36				
1785	8	68	73	5	12				
1786	5	22	132	20	46				
1787	8	25	81	12	33				
1788	22	16	49	8	24				
1789	8		24	1	32				
1790	11		68	15	43	2			
1791	18	25	87	5	47	3			
1792	6	2	46	6	50				
1793	6		31	1	34				
1794	16	1	15	120	55	17			
1795	14	8	28	112	99	28			
1796	5	33	30	347	34	65			
1797	10	56	91	91	133	21	12	5	
1798	1	3	66		135	18	41	44	16
1799	4	4			11	17			
1800	4	2	21		88	11	2	2	
1801	10	1	103	132	28		3	3	
1802	17	4	61	87	94		15	6	2
1803	29	1	65	37	91		10	3	
1804	13	1	76		110		22	18	33
1805	15		131	8	107	7	21	84	34
1806	9		161	15	112	25	49	50	11
1807	0		72	4	33	9	9	20	15
1808	0		293		2				
1809	0		347	2	8	1			
1810	0		31	4	25	5			
1811	0		35		0				
1812			33		0				
1813			35		0				
1814			43	4	13				
1815									
1816					120				
1817		1							
1818					122				
1819					112				
1820					91				
1821									

Sources: For Venice, Trieste, Malta, Genova, Livorno and Marseille see *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006. For Barcelona, Malaga and Cadiz data is derived from the *Diario de Barcelona, 1792-1801*, in Eloy Martin Corrales, “La flotta greco-otomana en Cadiz a fines del siglo XVIII” in *Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Andalusia, Andalusia Moderna (II)*, Cordoba 1995, pp. 389-400.

Appendix III

Greek-owned ships at the port of Livorno 1767-1821 according to their flags

Year	Ottoman	% Ottoman/ total	Venetian	% Venetian /total	Russian	% Russian /total		Ionian	% Ionian /total	Total
1767	8	80	2	20						10
1768	19	90	3	10						22
1769	3	75	1	25						4
1770	6	60	4	40						10
1771	3	33			6	67				9
1772	3	37	2	25	3	38				8
1773	8	50	6	38	2	12				16
1774	12	75	1	6	3	19				16
1775	15	88	2	12						17
1776	9	75	3	25						12
1777	4	57	3	43						7
1778	8	80	2	20						10
1779	7	32	15	68						22
1780	14	67	7	23						21
1781	14	82	2	12	1	6				17
1782	16	73	6	27						22
1783	16	73	6	27						22
1784	29	81	7	19						36
1785	11	92			1	8				12
1786	45	98	1	2						46
1787	28	85	3	9	2	6				33
1788	22	92	2	8						24
1789	28	87	4	13						32
1790	37	86	4	9	2	5				43
1791	40	85	7							47
1792	44	88	6							50
1793	29	85	5							34
1794	43	78	12							55
1795	82	83	17							99
1796	24	71	10							34
1797	133	100								133
1798	135	100								135
1799	11	100								11
1800	57	65			31	35%				88
1801	24	86			4	14%				28
1802	60	64			27	29%	7	7%		94
1803	51	56			26	29%	14	15%		91
1804	69	63			32	29%	8	8%		110
1805	86	80			13	12%	8	8%		107
1806	110	98					2	2%		112
1807	33	100								33
1808	1	50			1	50%				2
1809	8	100								8
1810	25	100								25
1811										
1812										
1813										
1814	35									35
1815	73	73			26	27%				99

1816									
1817									
1818									
1819									
1820									
1821									

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

Appendix IV

Arrivals at the port of Malta, 1780-1810

Έτος	Ottoman		Venetian	Russian	Jerusalem	Ionian	Other	total
1780	15		7		2			24
1781	22		13					35
1782	30		3					33
1783	26		9					35
1784	38		5					43
1785	66		5	2				73
1786	113		11	7			1	132
1787	75		3	2			1	81
1788	46		1	2				49
1789	22		1	1				24
1790	66		2	0				68
1791	87		0	0				87
1792	43		3	0				46
1793	28		3	0				31
1794	14		1	0				15
1795	21		4	0	2		1	28
1796	19		9	0			2	30
1797	87			2			2	91
1798	62			0			4	66
1799	0			0				0
1800	12			5			4	21
1801	73			10		3	16	103
1802	36			18		5	2	61
1803	27			25		13		65
1804	46			21		9		76
1805	83			28		21		132
1806	112			22		26		160
1807	18			26	9	14	5	72
1808	30			0	259		4	293
1809	146			0	192	1	8	347
1810	19			0	7	3	1	31
	1482		80	171	471			2352

Source: *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2004-2006

Appendix V

Participation of Greek-owned ships in the total arrivals of the ports of Livorno and Genoa, 1792-1802

	Livorno	Greek		Genoa	Greek	
1792	646	50	8%	992	6	1%
1793	547	34	6%	1229	1	
1794	1135	55	5%	1155	120	10%
1795	1048	99	10%	1549	112	7%
1796	457	34	7%	1114	347	31%
1797	683	133	20%	1.256	91	7%
1798	575	135	25%	828		
1799	405	11	3%	181		
1800	945	88	9%	251		
1801	316	28	9%	517	132	25%
1802	1003	94	9%	953	87	9%
1803	633	91		566	37	
1804	943	110		136		
1805	713	107		140	8	

Sources: For Livorno, ASL, Governo civile e militare di Livorno, F. 61, 664-665, F. 82, 129-131, F. 89 274. For Genova, see Luigi Bulferetti e Claudio Constantini, *Industrie e commerci in Liguria nell' eta del Risorgimento*, Milano 1965, σελ. 161, data from A.N.P., F20 191, Etat general des navires. For Greek-owned vessel, *Amphitrete, 1700-1821*, Research Project « Pythagoras », Ionian University/Greek Ministry of Education, 2006

Appendix VI

Participation of Greek-owned vessels in Alexandria and Odessa, 1780-1821

	Alexandria Total arrivals	Greek	%	Odessa Total departures	Greek Departures	%
1780	618	332	54			
1781	432	277	64			
1782	527	379	72			
1783	541	324	60			
1784						
1785	614	325	53			
1786						
1787	527	293	56			
1788	589	260	44			
1789	467	158	34			
1790	364	90	25			
1791						
1792						
1793						
1794						
1795						
1796						
1797						
1798						
1799						
1800						
1801				99	71	72
1802				256	121	48
1803				473	136	29
1804				382	154	40
1805				552	209	38
1806				106	61	58
1807				29	1	3
1808				276	158	57
1809				158	81	51
1810	356	204	57	190	158	83
1811	383	266	69	498	472	95
1812	299	205	69	514	507	99
1813				300	287	96
1814				360	343	95
1815	372	256	69	422	313	74
1816	311	153	49	826	430	52
1817				933	450	48
1818				621	356	57
1819				675	345	51
1820				635	306	48
1821				532	157	30

Sources: Vassilis Kremmydas, *Elliniki nautilia*, vol. 1, pp. 39, 73. His data for Alexandria derives from Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondence Consulaire et Commerciale, Alexandrie, vol. 16-26 (1732-1835) and from Archives Nationales de France (ANF), série Affaires Étrangères, sous- série BI (Correspondence Consulaire), 112-114, Alexandrie, vol. 13-15 (1777-1790), and sous- série BIII (Mémoire et Tableaux Statistiques), 272-280, (1780-1826). For Odessa, General Archives (Public Record Office), Foreign Office, 359/1, Odessa (1801-1835).

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¹ A first version of this article was presented in the XIVth International Economic History Congress in Helsinki, August 2006 under the title “Ottoman State, Finance and Maritime Trade: the emergence of an Ottoman- Greek fleet, 1780-1820”.

² Allan Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution. Collected Essays*, vol. 1, edited by Edward Ingram, Frank Cass, 1993, p. 166.

³ Vassilis Kremmydas, “I Othomaniki autokratoria kai i anankastiki autonomisi tou emporiou” (The Ottoman Empire and the forced independence of the commerce), *O Politis* 40 (1997), p. 33 and generally, 30-33. For a similar view, expressed however in more direct terms, see Konstantinos Alexantris, *I anaviosis tis thalassias mas dynameos kata tin Tourkokratian (The Revival of our Maritime Strength during the Tourkokratia)*, Athens: Ekdosis Istorikis Ypiresias B.N., 1960, pp. 27, 35.

⁴ Edhem Eldem, “Strangers in their own seas? The Ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century”, unpublished paper. We wish to thank Professor Eldem for making this paper available to us. It has recently been published in Turkish under the title “Kontrolü Kaybetmek: 18 Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Doğu Akdeniz’de Osmanlı Varlığı”, Ö.Kumrular, (ed.), *Türkler ve Deniz*, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007, pp. 63-78.

⁵ Lazaros Houmanidis, “Peri tis oikonomias kai nautilias ton trion nison Ydras, Spetson kai Psaron kata tin Tourkokratian”, (About the economy and shipping of the three islands of Hydra, Spetses and Psara during the period of Turkokratia), *Epistimoniki Epetiris tis Panteiou Anotatis Sholis Politikon Epistimon*, Athens 1972, p. 180.

⁶ Michael Lambrinides, *Istorikai selides (1320-1821). Oi Alvanoι kata tin kyrios Ellada kai tin Peloponnison. Ydra-Spetsai*, (The Albanians in the Greek Mainland and Peloponnese. Hydra and Spetses), Athens 1907, reprint, Athens: Notis Karavias bookshop: 1987, p. 38.

⁷ Daniel Panzac, « International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th century, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24, 2 (1992), pp. 189-206. See also Eldem, “Strangers in their own seas ?”

⁸ The research project titled “Greek Maritime History in the Eighteenth Century” was funded by E.U. and the Ministry of Greek Education. Its aim was to identify, chart and interpret the path of the fleet of Ottoman and Venetian Greek subjects in the trade and shipping of the Mediterranean Sea during the eighteenth century. The project was led by Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakonstantinou, who was the post-doctorate researcher; in charge of the research in the Istanbul Archives was Sophia Laiou. The team consisted of 20 individuals including Greek, Turkish, Italian, Maltese and Dutch researchers that worked in the Archives of Venice, Istanbul, Trieste, Malta, Messina, Napoli, Livorno, Genova, Marseille, London and Amsterdam, along with those of Athens, Corfu, Cephalonia, Hydra and Spetses. More than 15,000 ships were registered for the period 1700-1821.

⁹ For shipping statistics of all European fleets for 1786-1787, see Ruggiero Romano, « Per una valutazione della flota mercantile europea alla fine del secolo XVIII », in *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani*, V, Milano 1962.

¹⁰ Paul Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris : Hachette, 1911, p. 97.

¹¹ See fn. 9.

¹² Jean Filippini, « Raguza e l'attività commerciale livornese nel Settecento » in Jean Pierre Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, vol. 2, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998, p. 84.

¹³ Romano, op.cit.

¹⁴ The number of 400 Ottoman ships is an estimate based on French sources, given by Traian Stoianovich, “L' Economie balkanique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (principalement d' après les archives consulaires françaises)”, thesis, doctorat d'université, Université de Paris, 1952, p. 114, cited in Georgios B. Leon (Leontaritis), “Elliniki emporiki nautilia (1453-1850)” (Greek Merchant Shipping) in Stelios A. Papadopoulos, *Elliniki emporini nautilia* (Greek Merchant Shipping), Athens: National Bank of Greece, 1972, p. 42. The average tonnage of 120 tons for the Ottoman Greek vessels is based on evidence from *Amphitrete*. An estimate of the size of the Ottoman flag fleet is a work under process and will be published in Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakonstantinou (eds), *The Rise of Greek shipping in the Mediterranean Trade of the 18th century*, forthcoming. Michel Fontenay, based on the above evidence has made an estimate of about 500 Ottoman Greek ships of 100 tons in his “The Mediterranean World, 1500-1800: Social and Economic Perspectives” in V. Mallia Milanés (ed.), *Hospitaller Malta, 1530-1798, Studies on the Early Modern Malta and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem*, Malta:1993, pp. 41-110.

¹⁵ Vassilis Sfyroeras, *Ta ellinika pliromata tou tourkikou stolou* (The Greek Crews of the Turkish Fleet), Athens 1968; Aikaterini Bekiaroglou-Exadaktylou, *Othomanika naupigeia ston paradosiako elliniko choro* (Ottoman Shipyards in the Traditional Greek Area), Athens: Politistiko Technologiko Idryma ETVA, 1994, pp.138-149; Halil İnalçık-Donald Quataert, (eds.), *An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 181; Nikos Svoronos, *To emporio tis Thessalonikis ton 18o aiona* (The Commerce of Thessaloniki in the 18th Century), Athens: Themelio, 1996, p. 157.

¹⁶ According to the shipping statistics by R. Romano, the British in 1786 hold the biggest European fleet with 881,963 tons, followed by the Dutch with 1871 ships of 397,709 tons, by the Swedish with 1224 ships of 169,279 tons. The Hanseatic towns owned the fourth biggest northern European fleet with 567 ships of 101,347 tons and the Portuguese the fifth one with 300 tons of 84,843 tons. Romano, “Per una valutazione”

¹⁷ Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day*, London: Routledge, 1996, tables 3.5-3.13

¹⁸ For the Livorno grain trade see Jean Pierre Filippini, “Il commercio del grano a Livorno nel Settecento” in Jean Pierre Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, vol. 2, pp. 318-371. For Marseille see Charles Carrière, *Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle*, Marseille: Institut historique de Provence, 1973, vol. 2, pp. 57-67 and Ruggiero Romano, *Commerce et prix du blé à Marseille au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris 1956. For Genoa see Laura Calosci, « Génova y la transformación del comercio Mediterráneo de Cataluña (1815-1840) », Departament d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Divisio de Ciències Jurídiques, Econòmiques i Socials, Universitat de Barcelona, 2002-2003, pp. 34-44. For Malaga, Cadiz and Barcelona see Eloy Martín Corrales, “Cereales y capitanes greco-otomanos en la Malaga de fines del siglo XVIII”, in *Estudis d'Història Econòmica*, vol. 1989/2, pp. 87-114 and Eloy Martín Corrales, “La flotta greco-otomana en Cadiz a fines del siglo XVIII” in *Actas*

del II Congreso de Historia de Andalusia, *Andalusia Moderna (II)*, Cordoba 1995, pp. 389-400.

¹⁹ For an insightful analysis of the relations of the French Levant trade with Malta and the increasing competition by the Greeks and their eventual predominance in the Levant trade of the island see Xavier Labat Saint Vincent, *Malte, une escale du commerce français en Méditerranée au XVIII^e siècle*, Presses Universitaires de Paris Sorbonne, forthcoming, Part I, chapter III, section II.

²⁰ Giuliano Procacci, *History of the Italian People*, London: Penguin Books 1991, pp. 255-271; Girolamo Arnaldi, *Italy and its Invaders*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2005, pp. 168-186.

²¹ See Table 4 in this paper and Gelina Harlaftis, “Greek shipping in the 18th century” in Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakonstantinou (eds), *The Rise of Greek shipping in the Mediterranean trade of the 18th century*, forthcoming.

²² Eloy Martín Corrales, “Cereales y capitanes greco-otomanos en la Malaga de fines del siglo XVIII”, in *Estudis d’Història Econòmica*, vol. 1989/2, pp. 87-114.

²³ For the increase of the Russian grain trade and shipping from the Black Sea ports see Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day*, London: Routledge, 1996, table 1.2, pp. 18-19. For Odessa see Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794-1914*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1986.

²⁴ See Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *I elliniki paroikia tis Tergestis, 1751-1830* (The Greek Community in Trieste, 1751-1830), 2 vols., Athens: University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986; Katerina Papakonstantinou, *Ellinikes emporikes epicheiriseis stin Kentriki Europi to deuteron miso tou 18ou aiona. I oikogeneia Pontika* (Greek Mercantile Enterprises in Central Europe in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: the Case of the Pondikas Family), unpublished PhD thesis, University of Athens 2002; Angeliki Inglesi, *Voreioelladites emporoi sto telos tis tourkokratias. Stauros Ioannou (1790-1820)*, (Traders from Northern Greece at the End of the Ottoman Rule. Stavros Ioannou), Athens: Istoriko Arheio-Politistiki symvoli tis Emporikis Trapezas tis Ellados, 2004.

²⁵ Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “I elliniki diaspora: i geographia kai i typologia tis” (The Greek Diaspora: Geography and Typology), in Spyros I. Asdrachas (ed.), *Elliniki Oikonomiki Istoria 15os-19os aionas* (Greek Economic History 15th-19th Centuries), Athens: Politistio Idryma Omilou Peiraios, 2003, pp.237-247; Gelina Harlaftis, *History of Greek-owned Shipping*, pp. 6-9, 40-51, 70-89; Gelina Harlaftis, “Mapping the Greek maritime diaspora from the early 18th to the late 20th century”, in Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, Gelina Harlaftis and Ioanna Minoglou (eds), *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks. Five Centuries of History*, Oxford: Berg 2005, pp. 147-171.

²⁶ DVNS. ĪZN.3, p. 33

²⁷ DVNS. ĪZN. d.3, p. 27.

²⁸ Nevertheless, the attacks against Ottoman Greek ships were quite frequent. Numerous references in the Antonios Lignos (ed.), *Archeion tis koinotitas Ydras, 1778-1832* (Archive of the Community of Hydra, 1778-1832), Peiraios: typois ephim. Sfairas, 1921 (henceforth: AKY), (vol. 1, pp. 36, 45, 48, 50-2, 55-56, 65, 69, 77, 82, 85-86, 77, 163, 233, 235, 264-65, 267-301, vol. 2, pp. 33-4, 176, v.3, 112-49, 97-101, 110) show that the Barbary and Maltese corsairs and pirates, whom some were Ottoman subjects from the Mani peninsula, constituted a major threat. According to Daniel Panzac, *Les Corsaires Barbaresques. La fin d’une epepee, 1800-1820*, Paris:

CNRS, 1999, pp. 63-64, between 1798 and 1803 there was an upsurge of attacks from the Barbary corsairs as a result of the sudden decrease of the Maghreb's resources due to the disappearance of their long-established commercial relations with France.

Moreover, the destruction of the Order of St. John in Malta by Napoleon in 1798 left the way open to the traditional profession of the Barbary states, that of plundering.

²⁹ The secondary bibliography on the foreign protection system is extensive. See mainly Halil İnalçık, "İmtiyazat", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., v. III, pp. 1179-1189; Maurits H. Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System. Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis in the 18th Century*, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2005, pp. 34-36, 42-45 for a reconsideration of the view that the foreign merchants (*müstemin*) enjoyed full legal autonomy; Ali İhsan .Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrî Müslimler*, 2 baskı, Ankara 1998, pp. 19-41; P. Kondoayannis, "Oi prostatauomenoi" (The protégés), *Athina* 29 (1917), pp. 1-160; Christine Philliou, "Mischiefs in the Old Regime: Provincial Dragomans at the Turn of the 19th Century", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (fall 2001), pp. 103-121.

³⁰ M.Çadırcı, "II Mahmut devrinde (1808-1839) Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları", *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi*, Osman Okyar- Halil İnalçık, (eds.), Ankara: Meteksan 1980, pp. 237-241; Bruce Masters, "The Sultan's Entrepreneurs: The Avrupa tüccaris and the Hayriye tüccaris in Syria", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24/4 (1992), pp. 579-597. Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, pp. 68-74; Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the 18th Century*, Leiden: Brill 1996, p. 292; Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau general de l'empire ottoman*, v.7, re-edition, İstanbul: Isis, 2001, p. 368.

³¹ Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, pp. 63-64. See also Eldem, *French Trade*, p. 293, where it is mentioned that in 1806 a high Ottoman official had asked the French ambassador Sebastiani to implement the principle of reciprocity included in the capitulations text.

³² Fabio di Vita, "Greek ships in Sicily during the 18th century: health practices and commercial relationships" in Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakonstantinou (eds), *The Rise of Greek shipping in the Mediterranean trade of the 18th century*, forthcoming.

³³ Gerasimos Pagratis, "I Consolati della Repubblica Settinsulare (1800-1807) in Sicilia", in the 2nd Mediterranean Maritime History Network Conference, Messina/Taormina, 3-7 May 2006, unpublished paper.

³⁴ *AKY*, vol. 2, pp. 339-341.

³⁵ *Almanaco di Genova per l'anno 1813*, p. 7.

³⁶ The last entry is dated in 12-21/4/1821 (evahir-i Receb 1236), little after the Greek revolution had begun. Pages 165-172 are blank and pages 173-179 include orders regarding various issues of the maritime commerce.

³⁷ There is only one reference to a Muslim Ottoman, one İbrahim son of İbrahim from Cyprus. A.DVNS.İZN 3, p. 147.

³⁸ Sometimes the captains were also the ship owners.

³⁹ See DVNS.İZN.3, pp.6-10. Also see pp. 18-19, where there are the three orders, titled as *temin emri* (safety order), *ticaret emri* (commerce order) and *muafiyet emri* (tax exemption order), given to a certain Lazari Yorgi from the island of Hydra.

⁴⁰ The official refers to the arbitrary levies, *avanas*, which the Ottoman officials in the ports usually demanded by the merchants. See İnalçık-Quataert, (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.2, p. 695.

⁴¹ DVNS. İZN 3, p.2. The grant of “privileges” to the islanders in the beginning of the 19th century is also referred in the Greek secondary sources. According to them, the “privileges” aimed to eliminate the Russian influence and included among others the “more effective protection on behalf of the Ottoman state”. See Anastasios Orlandos, *Peri tis nisou Petsas i Spetson* (Regarding the island of Petsa os Spetses), Peiraias 1877, pp. 37-38; Alexandris, *Anaviosis*, p. 279; Konstantinos Svolopoulos, “O ellinikos emporikos stolos kata tas paramonas tou agonos tis anexartiasias. Anekdotos pinax tou F. Pouqueville” (The Greek merchant marine in the eve of the struggle for independence. The unpublished table of F. Pouqueville), *Eranistis* 1/59 (1973), pp. 200-201.

⁴² Panayotis Mourouzis was dragoman of the imperial fleet from December 1803 until December 1806. Vassilis Sfyroeras, *Oi dragomanoi tou stolou, o thesmos kai oi phoreis* (The Dragomans of the Fleet. The Institution and the Personnel), Athens 1965, pp. 148-153.

⁴³ *AKY*, vol.2, pp. 177-178.

⁴⁴ *AKY*, vol.2, p. 372.

⁴⁵ For the events of 1806 see Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, pp. 85-93; Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations*, pp. 29, 109-111. Also W.M.Leake mentioned the request of the reaya of the islands of Spetses and Hydra to the Sublime Porte in 1806, who were “envious of the lower duties and other commercial advantages which their protected countrymen partake with Frank traders and provoked at their insolence”, and protested for the unequal conditions of trade. William Martin Leake, *Travels in the Morea*, v.II, Amsterdam: Hakkert 1968, pp. 344-345.

⁴⁶ *AKY*, vol.2., p.398

⁴⁷ *AKY*, vol. 2, pp. 392-395, 399-400.

⁴⁸ *AKY*, vol.2, p. 402.

⁴⁹ The practice of presenting guarantors (*kefil*) was extensively used by the Ottoman state as a means to ensure that certain obligations would be fulfilled on behalf of the Ottoman subjects. For example the non Muslim Ottoman subjects who applied for permission to travel to the Black Sea they had to provide similar warranty letters, stating that they would not stay in Russia. Bostan, “İzn-i Sefine Defterleri”, p. 29.

⁵⁰ See for example DVNS.İZN.3, p. 77. *AKY*, vol. 2, pp. 392, 393.

⁵¹ DVNS. İZN.3, pp. 64, 68, 74, 76.

⁵² Dimitrakis Ralli, warrantor for Panayotis son of Andoni from Izmir, and Yannis son of Vitali, warrantor of Stathis son of Yorgis, from Istanbul are characterized as “merchants of Europe”. DVNS. İZN 3, p. 146.

⁵³ DVNS.İZN 3, pp. 63, 67.

⁵⁴ DVNS.İZN 3, pp. 63, 149.

⁵⁵ DVNS.İZN 3, pp. 71, 77.

⁵⁶ DVNS.İZN 3, p. 63, 65, 67.

⁵⁷ DVNS.İZN 3, p. 134, 143 respectively. See also DVNS.İZN 3, 71, 73

⁵⁸ DVNS.İZN 3, p. 144. The *kapan* merchants were responsible for the importation of foodstuffs to Istanbul and quite often they were also ship-owners. According to Çizakça, these merchants were acting as investors, who formed partnerships with other merchants. Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution*, pp. 117-122. See also Halil İnalçık, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire”, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1978, pp. 120, 136 for the involvement of Ottoman officials in trade and investments of capital in partnerships.

⁵⁹ See also Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, London: I.B. Tauris 2006, pp. 159-160 on how the Ottoman state and some officials profited from the foreign trade despite the low custom dues because of the capitulations.

⁶⁰ According to Sfyroeras, in 1803 the dragoman received 100 ğuruş for each ship, which got the permission to enter the Black Sea. Sfyroeras, *Oi dragomanoi*, p. 45.

⁶¹ Stanford Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, *Turcica* 1 (1969), pp. 222-223, 229-230. The author has characterized these naval reforms as “the most successful aspect of Selim III’s efforts to restore the empire”, *op.cit.*, 240.

⁶² Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New. The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.

⁶³ “Benim vezirim bu makule hususa daima vakit olunub takrir mücebine nizam verile ve daima üzerine olunub teksir-i tüccara ve sefaine sarf-i makdur olunsun zira ticareti ve teksir-i sefaini hiç kimesne iltizam eylemiyor ma heza düvel-i sairenin ancak maslahatı emr-i ticaretdir. Bizim ise, ticaret sefaini kalmadı. Bilmem tedarikin tariki nedir.”, *DVNS.İZN* 3, p. 2.

⁶⁴ Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations*, p. 111; Masters, “The Sultan’s Entrepreneurs”, pp. 579, 585; Philliou, “Mischief in the Old Regime”, pp. 115-120.

⁶⁵ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 12-13; İnalçık, “Capital Formation”, p. 97; Eldem, *French Trade*, p. 270.

⁶⁶ Donald Quataert, «Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997), pp. 410, 412.

⁶⁷ Kontoyannis, “Oi prostateuomenoi”, p. 32 fn. 2

⁶⁸ Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, pp. 77-78; Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 341.

Demetrios Mourouzis was appointed dragoman of the Sublime Porte in 1808, Sfyroeras, *Oi dragomanoi*, pp. 143, 152-153.

⁶⁹ David Urquhart, *La Turquie; ses ressources, son organization municipale, son commerce*, Paris: Arthus Bertrand 1836, vol. III, pp. 162-163 fn.1; Georg G.Gervinus, *Ιστορία της επανάστασεως και αναγεννήσεως της Ελλάδος* (History of the Greek Revolution and Resurrection), Athens: Ch.N. Philadelphus 1864, pp. 87-88.

⁷⁰ Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations*, pp. 105-109. According to Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde*, pp. 36-37, before the initiative of Selim III, whenever the Ottoman state tried to limit the number of the protégés, the foreign ambassadors managed to cancel any such effort.

⁷¹ *AKY*, vol.3, pp. 43-46.

⁷² Masters, “The Sultan’s Entrepreneurs”, p. 582.

⁷³ Urquhart, *La Turquie*, p. 162-163 fn.1

⁷⁴ Urquhart, *La Turquie*, p. 163.

⁷⁵ “After 1776 the majority of ships of ‘Greek ownership’ carried the Russian flag”, Georgios Dertilis et al, *Istoria tou ellinikou kratous, 1830-1920* (History of the Greek state, 1830-1920), Athens: Estia, 2005, p. 196. On the other hand, Vassilis Kremmydas is rather sceptical of this argument: “what is generally believed, that the Russian flag acted as a panacea for Greek shipping, or as a catalyst for its development is a non-academic exaggeration. It seems that its use took a long time to spread...”. Vassilis Kremmydas, *Elliniki nautilia*, vol. 1 , p. 22 fn. 2.

⁷⁶ Vassilis Kremmydas, *Synkyria kai emporio stin proepanastatiki Peloponniso (1793-1821)* (Conjuncture and Trade in the Pre-revolutionary Peloponnisos 1793-1821), Athens: Themelio, 1980, pp. 189, 209-210.

⁷⁷ Svolopoulos, “O ellinikos emporikos stolos”, p. 201.

⁷⁸ Jean Pierre Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814)*, 2nd volume, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998, p. 64.

⁷⁹ See also Kremmydas, *Elliniki nautilia*, vol. 1, p. 22 fn. 2.

⁸⁰ See Despoina Vlami, *To fiorini, to stari kai i odos tou kipou. Ellines emporoi sto Livorno, 1750-1868* (The fiorini, the grain and the Garden street. Greek merchants in Livorno, 1750-1868), Athens: Themelio 2000, p. 77.

⁸¹ Jean Pierre Filippini in his opus on Livorno trade and shipping clearly refers to these archives which he has extensively used. See Jean Pierre Filippini, *Il porto di Livorno*, vol. 2, pp. 100-101.

⁸² We would like to thank Dr Elisabetta Tonizzi for making it possible to access this valuable Journal.

⁸³ We would like to thank the staff of the BOA archive for facilitating our research there as well as Dr. Phokion Kotzageorgis. For these registers see İdris Bostan, “İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları 1780-1846”, *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (1990), pp. 21-41. According to Dr. Hacı Veli Aydın, a member of the research group as described in footnote 8, more than 80% of these vessels belonged to Ottoman Greeks. Hacı Veli Aydın, “Greek merchants and seafarers in the Black Sea, 1780-1820”, in Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakostantinou (eds), *The Rise of Greek shipping in the Mediterranean trade of the 18th century*, forthcoming.

⁸⁴ The main financier of the shipowners of Spetses for example was the Peloponnesian Hadjipanayiotis Politis, also a merchant and shipowner, established in Leonidion, opposite from the island of Spetses, on the Peloponnesian coast. Hadjipanayiotis-Politis was a relative of the equally wealthy Peloponnesian merchant Trouchanis or Trochanis, as well as of the leading Spetsiot Mexis family, which in turn was related through intermarriage to most of the important Spetsiot shipping families. From the archives of his business that were found and studied by Vassilis Kremmydas, it has been calculated that between 1783 and 1821 he was the co-owner of 26 deep-sea going sailing ships, together with the Spetsiots Hadjiyannis and Tehodarakis Mexis, Demetrakis Yannouzas, Lazarou-Orloff, Dimigionis (Ginis), Zakithinaios, Klissas, Panos, Santos, Sklias, Gikas Tzioupas (Tsoupas) and Spyridonos. Apart from being a co-owner of sailing ships, he collaborated with over fifty Spetsiot shipowners and provided the capital required *sermagia*, for the purchase of cargo. During the forty-year course of his commercial and maritime enterprises he provided capital for cargoes on over 300 ships, over and above the cargoes transported by his own vessels. See Vassilis Kremmydas, *Archeio Chatzipanagioti* (Hadjipanagiotis Archive), Athens 1973, pp. 149-151.

⁸⁵ See also Vassilis Kremmydas, *Elliniki nautilia, 1776-1835* (Greek Shipping, 1776-1835), Athens: Istoriko Archeio. Emporiki Trapeza tis Ellados, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 36-38.

⁸⁶ See Vassilis Kremmydas, “Katagrapfi ton emporikon ploion tou Irakleiou to 1751” (Register of the merchant ships of Herakleion in 1751), *Mnimon* 7 (1978-1979), pp. 12-17; Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*, Leiden: Brill 1996, pp. 86-130; Edhem Eldem, “Strangers in their own seas?”.